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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
FEDERAL COURTS-ORDER REMANDING CASE FOR REASONS NOT
RECOGNIZED BY STATUTE REVIEWABLE BY WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

Thermtron Products,Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,423 U.S. 336 (1976).

Traditionally, many civil actions brought in state courts are also
within the original jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States.'
One congressionally created corollary of this concurrent jurisdiction is
that under the proper circumstances a defendant may remove to federal
2
court and proceed as if the case had originally been brought there.
However, if it subsequently appears that the case was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction," 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) requires
that the case be remanded to state court.' In the past, review of almost
1. See C. WirGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 171 (2d ed. 1970). Original civil jurisdiction
is primarily conferred on federal district courts by sections 1331 and 1332 of title 28
of the United States Code.
Section 1331 places jurisdiction in the district courts for "all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
Section 1332 gives federal district courts original jurisdiction for all civil actions
where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, and where diversity of citizenship
exists between opposing litigants. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446 (1970). Section 1446 sets out the procedure for
removal. Section 1441 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion,
may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1970) provides:
(c) If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was
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all remand orders has been held barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) 4 and
6 the
its predecessors.' In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,
Supreme Court has limited the scope of this restriction and may have
effectively eliminated the rule.

Thermtron grew out of an action filed in Kentucky state
court by two Kentucky citizens against Thermtron Products, Inc. and

an employee, both citizens of Indiana, for damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. Thermtron removed the
action to federal court. Following an order requesting the defendants
to show cause why the case should not be remanded and a conclusory
response by Thermtron,1 Judge Hermansdorfer remanded the case to
state court. In a memorandum opinion, he reasoned that the de-

fendant's right to remove the action was outweighed by the "plaintiffs'
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall reThe State court
mand the case, and may order the payment of just costs ....
may thereupon proceed with such case.
Under this section, only cases improperly removed may be remanded. E.g., Isbrandtsen
Co. v. Marine Engineers Ben. Ass'n., 256 F. Supp. 68 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
4. E.g., Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U.S. 563, 568 (1941); In re
MacNeil Bros., 259 F.2d 386, 388 (lst Cir. 1958). 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970)
provides:
(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to
section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
Section 1443 authorizes removal of state court actions in which the defendant is unable
to enforce his rights "under any law providing for the equal rights of citizens of the
United States .

. . ."

Circuit Court .

. . ."

28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)

(1970).

On the civil rights exception to

section 1447(d) see Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 786-87 n.6 & 7 (1966); Note,
Practiceand Procedure-Review of Order Remanding to State Court-TacticalWindfall
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 N.C.L. Rav. 628 (1965).
5. Prior to 1875, courts would not review any remand order, by appeal or writ
of error, because no final judgment had been entered. See, e.g., Chicago & A. R.R. v.
Wiswall, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 507 (1875). The Judiciary Act of 1875, however, expressly provided for review of remand orders by writ of error or appeal. Judiciary
Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472.
The first statutory bar on reviewability was embodied in the Act of March 3,
1887, which provided in part:
Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any
circuit court of the United States, and the circuit court shall decide that the
cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the
State court from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried
into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the circuit
court so remanding such cause shall be allowed.
Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 553. The same provision reappeared in
the Judicial Code of 1911, and sections 71 and 80 of title 28 of the United States Code
in 1926. The statute was put in its present form in section 1447 in 1949.
6. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
7. "These defendants would not have removed this case . .. if they thought or
had reason to believe that they could receive a fair and impartial trial in the Pike
Defendants' Objections to Removal at 1.
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right to a forum of their own choice and their right to a speedy decision on the merits ..
.. "; as a result of the district court's crowded
docket, s the case could be heard at an earlier time in the state court
and Thermtron had not shown that it would be prejudiced by the remand.'
Thermtron then petitioned the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for
a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court lacked authority to
remand the case on grounds other than those specified in section
1447(c).10 Finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a remand
order under section 1447(d), the circuit court denied Thermtron's
petition."1 Thermtron appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed
the Sixth Circuit.
Both the majority and dissenting Supreme Court opinions recognized that Congress was aware of two dangers when it enacted section
1447: the danger of delay to litigants,' 2 and the danger of depriving
litigants of a federal forum as a result of a district court judge's abuse
of discretion."3 However, they disagreed concerning the dangers
against which Congress intended to provide protection.' The dissent,
following the traditional interpretation of the statute, found that Congress only intended to prevent delay at the expense of possible prejudice
to litigants in state courts. 4 While the majority agreed with this posi8. According to Judge Hermansdorfer, not only were there 474 cases on the
court's docket at the time of the remand order, but the case would be among the last
of these to be heard:
[O]n February 28, 1974 there were pending on the dockets [of] . . . this
Court . . . a total of eighty (80) criminal actions and three hundred ninetyfour (394) civil actions. These cases have been assigned various priorities.
The first priority is granted criminal actions. Social Security and Black Lung
cases . . . [are] second . . . . A third priority is granted those actions in
which the United States is a party. The lowest priority, as a matter of necessity, is assigned private civil actions.
Little v. Thermtron, No. 1723 at 4 (E.D. Ky., filed March 22, 1974) (footnotes
omitted).
9. Id. at 5.
10. 423 U.S. at 341.
11. "In our opinion the District Court had jurisdiction to enter the order of
remand. We have no jurisdiction to review it." Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, No. 74-1410 (6th Cir., filed June 4, 1974).
12. 423 U.S. at 351, 361, both citing United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742 (1946).
13. 423 U.S. at 351, 355.
14. Congress balanced the continued disruption and delay caused by further
review against the minimal possible harm to the party attempting removalwho will still receive a trial on the merits before a state court which cannot
be presumed to be unwilling or unable to afford substantial justice-and concluded that no review should be permitted in these cases.
Id. at 355. Cf. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DrVsION OF JUIusDICnoN
BETwEEN STATE Am FEDERAL CoURTS 417 (1969) ('The theory behind the preclusion
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tion, it also recognized, for the first time, Congress's intent to control
judicial discretion."a The policy assumptions of the majority and the
dissent were reflected in their differing constructions of section 1447 (d).
Assuming that sections 1447(c) and (d) were drafted to accommodate both interests, the majority found the two sections to be in pari
materia and construed them together.16 Thus, they reasoned that the
limited scope of permissible remands described in section 1447(c) was
incorporated in section 1447(d), so that its bar of review extended
only to remand orders authorized by the statute. Conversely, appeal
of remand orders issued for reasons not contemplated by the statute,
as in Thermtron, was not prohibited by section 1447 (d).1" The dissent,
assuming that the section had only one purpose, strictly construed sec-

tion 1447(d) and found that it barred review of all remand orders,
regardless of the reason they were issued.'
The cases relied on by the majority to support its in par! materia

reading of the statute' 9 reached results more consistent with the dissent's conclusion.2 0

However, none of these cases reached the issue

of the degree of a district judge's discretion in the remand process, so
that the broad statements cited by the dissent were merely dicta.21
of review is apparently that time-consuming federal proceedings should not be allowed
to delay the completion of litigation commenced in a state court having at least concurrent jurisdiction over the action.").
15. [We are not convinced that Congress ever intended to extend carte blanche
authority to the district courts to revise the federal statutes governing removal
by remanding cases on grounds that seem justifiable to them but which are
not recognized by the controlling statute.
423 U.S. at 351. This conclusion concerning legislative intent was based in part on a
finding that section 1447 was not intended to change the law relating to the review of
remand orders. See H.R. RE'. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1949). Interpreting
"so remanding" in previous versions of the statute to refer only to authorized remand
orders, the majority inferred a legislative intent to limit the bar on review of remand
orders that was readopted when the Code was revised. 423 U.S. at 348-50. See note
5 supra.
16. 423 U.S. at 345-46.
17. Id. at 351. See note 3 supra.
18. Id. at 355.
19. E.g., Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 380 (1937)
(The remand and review sections of the Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36
Stat. 1087, as amended 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)-(d) "are in pai materia [and] are to be
construed accordingly rather than as distinct enactments. .. ").
20. Id. at 381 (Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, as amended
28 U.S.C. 1447(d) is "intended to . . . include all cases removed from a state court
into federal court and remanded by the latter.").
21. See United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742 (1946) (Judicial Code of 1911, ch.
231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970) bars review of
remand order issued because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Metropolitan Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U.S. 563 (1941) (Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36
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Thus, even though previous Supreme Court cases supported aspects of

both arguments, none were dispositive of the matter.
Since both the majority's and dissents readings of the statute

reflect equally plausible interpretations of congressional intent and prior
case law, their validity must be examined in light of the assumptions
that underlie each. So viewed, the majority's construction of the statute

is potentially inconsistent with its finding of congressional intent. This
inconsistency follows from the practical problems of implementing,
without emasculating, the court's decision.
As the dissent recognized, 22 there is little difference between a
remand order based on inappropriate considerations, as in Thermtron,
and one issued as a result of a misapplication of appropriate factors.
Both are unauthorized by section 1447(c) and therefore, under the

majority's reasoning, appealable. Despite the majority's language to
the contrary, 23 a distinction based on the form of a remand order would
contravene any intent of Congress to prevent judicial abuses and would
render the majority holding meaningless.24 If review of both unStat. 1087, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (1970) bars review of remand order
issued because of lack of separable controversy); Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U.S. 199
(1940) (Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, as amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d) (1970) bars review of remand order issued because of lack of diversity
jurisdiction); Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374 (1937) (Judicial
Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970)
bars review of remand order issued because of lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant); Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) (Judicial Code of 1911,
ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970) bars review of
remand order issued because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Missouri Pac. Ry.
v. Fitzgerald, 134 U.S. 45 (1896) (Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552,
as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970) bars review of remand order issued because
of lack of diversity jurisdiction); In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U.S. 451 (1890) (Act of
March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970)
bars review of remand issued because of lack of jurisdictional amount); Morey v.
Lockhart, 123 U.S. 56 (1887) (Act of March 3, 18$7, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, as
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970) bars review of remand order; reason for remand
unclear).
22. 423 U.S. at 355-57.
23. The majority attempted to limit the decision to the facts of the case:
In so holding we neither disturb nor take issue with the well-established
general rule that § 1447(d) and its predecessors were intended to forbid review
by appeal or extraordinary writ of any order remanding a case on the grounds
permitted by the statute. But this Court has not yet construed the present or
past prohibition against review of remand orders so as to extinguish the
that remanded
has not merely
power
an appellate
court toprovision
correct for
a district
erred inofapplying
the requisite
remandcourt
but has
a case
on grounds not specified in the statute and not touching the propriety of the
removal.
Id. at 351-52.
24. If review of a remand order is precluded by a judge's use of the proper
language, i.e. that the case was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction",
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authorized remand orders is available, Thermtron effectively repeals
section 1447(d), since any remand order should be reviewable in order
to correct possible abuses.2 5 Therefore the majority holding is unsatisfactory because it is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of the stat-

ute: preventing delay.
While Thermtron's inconsistencies make its effect on future cases
with slightly different facts unclear,2 it has expanded federal jurisdiction

and the potential for abuse and delay. On the surface the decision's
correction of an unauthorized exercise of power by Judge Hermansdorfer

is laudable, but its consequences make the ruling hard to justify. Congress expressed an intention to tolerate certain error for the overall

benefit of speedy justice by enacting section 1447(d).

The court

should have followed this clear objective.
Tony M. Graham
federal district judges will certainly clothe future remand orders appropriately. In
such cases, correction of abuse by district court judges would again be impossible, a
result inapposite to the rationale of the majority.
25. By virtue of the holding in Thermtron, circuit courts now have jurisdiction to
correct abuse of discretion by district court judges when a remand order is issued for
reasons not contemplated by section 1447(c). Since district judges are put on notice
to use the proper language when issuing a remand order, review by a circuit court
should be predicated on substance rather than form. Likewise, all remand orders
should be subject to review to determine whether the standards of section 1447(c) have
been followed.
26. Since neither of the two basic readings of Thermtron are entirely satisfactory, it
is difficult to predict which the lower courts will adopt. See notes 24 & 25 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss1/8

6

Graham: Federal Courts--Order Remanding Case for Reasons Not Recognized b

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013

7

